Laureano Vallenilla Lanz es uno de los intelectuales más influyentes de la Venezuela de finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX. Pertenece a la generación de teóricos que se nutrió fundamentalmente de la doctrina positivista e hizo de ella la herramienta para desarrollar la interpretación de nuestra realidad con el fin de edificar una estable y próspera nación. Las ideas que guían el presente examen recogen su postura ante la historia, el individuo y la sociedad, la (...) religión, la educación, el centralismo, la guerra y la paz. (shrink)

En el estudio que aquí se presenta se analiza hasta qué punto se puede llegar a una situación democrática estable, siguiendo los planteamientos del Cesarismo Democrático de Laureano Valenilla Lanz, que para conseguir los objetivos utilitaristas señalados por Simón Bolívar en su Manifiesto de Cartagena, intentó construir un sistema autoritario de gobierno. En contra de los razonamientos expresados por el autor venezolano, y desde una óptica más actual, hablar de democracia no supone quedarse en la mera constatación de (...) las realidades concretas, sino hacerlo desde una perspectiva de deber ser. Aceptar los hechos tal y como son, tiene como consecuencia teórica la ausencia de criterio demarcador que oriente la política concreta y, cómo no, la labor intelectual. Entre los objetivos de estas páginas resaltan dos: la democracia se refuerza con un mayor grado de democracia; y que la lucha por las condiciones económicas, sociales o laborales, no puede ser desgajada de la pugna política por conseguir cada vez mayores espacios democráticos, tanto en la sociedad como en el Estado. (shrink)

Libro sumamente valioso. Tras sendas visiones de conjunto, muy logradas, del positivismo en América Latina en general y en Venezuela en particular, siguen capítulos sobre: Adolfo Ernst; Rafael Villavicencio; Vicente Marcano; Lasandro Alvarado; Luis Razetti; Guillermo Delgado Palacios; Luis López Méndez; José Gil Fortoul; Laureano Vallenilla Lanz; César Zumeta y Manuel Arcaya. Tiende a hacer comparaciones con otras manifestaciones del positivismo latinoamericano"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

According to the dual inheritance theory, cultural learning in our species is a biased and highly efficient process of transmitting cultural traits. Here we define a model of cultural learning where social learning is integrated as a complementary element that facilitates the discovery of a specific behavior by an apprentice, and not as a mechanism that works in opposition to individual learning. In that context, we propose that the emergence of the ability to approve or disapprove of offspring behavior, orienting (...) their learning, transformed primate social learning into a cultural transmission system, like that which characterizes our species. Assessor teaching facilitates the replication and/or reconstruction of behaviors that are difficult to imitate and helps to determine which behaviors should be imitated. We also explore the form in which assessor teaching has conditioned the evolution of our abilities to develop cultures in the hominin line, converting us into individuals equipped with what we call a suadens psychology. Our main point is to defend the hypothesis that suadens psychology determines the stability and dynamics that affect the trajectories of many cultural characters. We compare our proposal with other theories about cultural evolution, specifically with dual inheritance theory and cultural attraction theory. (shrink)

This paper presents the hypothesis that linguistic capacity evolved through the action of natural selection as an instrument which increased the efficiency of the cultural transmission system of early hominids. We suggest that during the early stages of hominization, hominid social learning, based on indirect social learning mechanisms and true imitation, came to constitute cumulative cultural transmission based on true imitation and the approval or disapproval of the learned behaviour of offspring. A key factor for this transformation was the development (...) of a conceptual capacity for categorizing learned behaviour in value terms - positive or negative, good or bad. We believe that some hominids developed this capacity for categorizing behaviour, and such an ability allowed them to approve or disapprove of their offsprings- learned behaviour. With such an ability, hominids were favoured, as they could transmit to their offspring all their behavioural experience about what can and cannot be done. This capacity triggered a cultural transmission system similar to the human one, though pre-linguistic. We suggest that the adaptive advantage provided by this new system of social learning generated a selection pressure in favour of the development of a linguistic capacity allowing children to better understand the new kind of evaluative information received from parents. (shrink)

El objeto de este análisis es examinar —naturalmente, de un modo introductorio— cuál puede ser la repercusión de los eventuales avances en los objetivos transhumanistas en el terreno de la responsabilidad criminal. A mi juicio, el análisis de las posibles consecuencias del transhumanismo en el dominio del Derecho penal afecta a dos ámbitos distintos: (i) en primer lugar, puede incidir en los factores que, hoy en día, vertebran la imputación de responsabilidad penal; (ii) por otro lado, es preciso abordar la (...) repercusión que el transhumanismo podría tener ya no en el juicio de imputación de responsabilidad penal, sino en la determinación de las consecuencias asignadas a los responsables penales y en su proceso de ejecución. Como más adelante se verá, esta reflexión arroja hoy en día más preguntas que respuestas. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo parte da análise da influência de Hegel na construção do conceito de capital e de ideologia, na obra de Marx. Para tal, buscou-se analisar a passagem dos primeiros escritos humanistas de Marx à sua teoria tardia. Da ruptura realizada por Marx em relação a suas obras de juventude, surge o problema de como determinar o sujeito, uma vez que a perspectiva humanista inicial é abandonada. A ideia é a de que, paradoxalmente, quando critica a dialética hegeliana, Marx (...) termina por encontrar problemas que poderiam ser resolvidos através de conceitos hegelianos, como a questão do sujeito de classe. É o que procuraremos argumentar por meio de uma análise sobre o papel da negatividade em Hegel.: This article starts with an analysis of the influence of Hegel on the construction of the concepts of capital and ideology in Marx's work. To this end, we analyze the transition from Marx's first humanist writings to his later theory. Due to the break achieved by Marx in relation to his early works, a problem arises: the determination of the revolutionary subject once the initial humanist perspective has been abandoned. Our thesis is that when Marx leaves Hegel, he paradoxically ends up encountering problems that can only be resolved by Hegelian dialectics,. We argue this by means of an analysis of the role of negativity in Hegel. (shrink)

I address the claim by Valor and Martínez that Goldstein's cassationist approach to Liar-like paradoxes generates paradoxes it cannot solve. I argue that these authors miss an essential point in Goldstein's cassationist approach, namely the thesis that paradoxical sentences are not able to make the statement they seem to make.

This paper explores and rehabilitates the value of decisional privacy as a conceptual tool, complementary to informational privacy, for critiquing personalized choice architectures employed by self-tracking technologies. Self-tracking technologies are promoted and used as a means to self-improvement. Based on large aggregates of personal data and the data of other users, self-tracking technologies offer personalized feedback that nudges the user into behavioral change. The real-time personalization of choice architectures requires continuous surveillance and is a very powerful technology, recently coined as (...) “hypernudging.” While users celebrate the increased personalization of their coaching devices, “hypernudging” technologies raise concerns about manipulation. This paper addresses that intuition by claiming that decisional privacy is at stake. It thus counters the trend to solely focus on informational privacy when evaluating information and communication technologies. It proposes that decisional privacy and informational privacy are often part of a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Hypernudging is used as a key example to illustrate that the two dimensions should not be treated separately. Hypernudging self-tracking technologies compromise autonomy because they violate informational and decisional privacy. In order to effectively judge whether technologies that use hypernudges empower users, we need both privacy dimensions as conceptual tools. (shrink)

The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in organizations has fundamentally changed from performing routine tasks to supervising human employees. While prior studies focused on normative perceptions of such AI supervisors, employees’ behavioral reactions towards them remained largely unexplored. We draw from theories on AI aversion and appreciation to tackle the ambiguity within this field and investigate if and why employees might adhere to unethical instructions either from a human or an AI supervisor. In addition, we identify employee characteristics affecting this (...) relationship. To inform this debate, we conducted four experiments (total N = 1701) and used two state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms (causal forest and transformers). We consistently find that employees adhere less to unethical instructions from an AI than a human supervisor. Further, individual characteristics such as the tendency to comply without dissent or age constitute important boundary conditions. In addition, Study 1 identified that the perceived mind of the supervisors serves as an explanatory mechanism. We generate further insights on this mediator via experimental manipulations in two pre-registered studies by manipulating mind between two AI (Study 2) and two human supervisors (Study 3). In (pre-registered) Study 4, we replicate the resistance to unethical instructions from AI supervisors in an incentivized experimental setting. Our research generates insights into the ‘black box’ of human behavior toward AI supervisors, particularly in the moral domain, and showcases how organizational researchers can use machine learning methods as powerful tools to complement experimental research for the generation of more fine-grained insights. (shrink)

A common argument in support of a beginning of the universe used by advocates of the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) is the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, or the “Infinity Argument”. However, it turns out that the Infinity Argument loses some of its force when compared with the achievements of set theory and it brings into question the view that God predetermined an endless future. We therefore defend a new formal argument, based on the nature of time (...) (just as geometrical reasoning is based on the nature of space), which addresses more directly the question of beginningless time. (shrink)

The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1/2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem (...) I address in this article. I suggest that ‘p whenever q and vice versa’ may be consistent with p and q having different probabilities if one of them refers to a sample space containing ordinary possible worlds and the other to a sample space containing centred possible worlds, because such spaces may fail to combine into one composite probability space and, as a consequence, ‘whenever’ may not be well defined; such is the main contribution of this article. 1The Sleeping Beauty Game2Groisman’s and Peter Lewis’s Approaches3Discussing Beauty’s Credences4The Principle of Equivalence's Failure5Making Sense of the Principle of Equivalence's Failure6Elga’s and Lewis’s Approaches7ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

Humans have developed the capacity to approve or disapprove of the behavior of their children and of unrelated individuals. The ability to approve or disapprove transformed social learning into a system of cumulative cultural inheritance, because it increased the reliability of cultural transmission. Moreover, people can transmit their behavioral experiences (regarding what can and cannot be done) to their offspring, thereby avoiding the costs of a laborious, and sometimes dangerous, evaluation of different cultural alternatives. Our thesis is that, during ontogeny, (...) the evaluative communication (approval/disapproval) between parents and offspring is substituted by other evaluative communications among peers, like individuals of the same generation. Each person belongs to a reference social group with individuals that interact more intensively. Humans have developed psychological mechanisms that enable cultural transmission by being receptive to parental advice as well as their reference social group. The selective pressure that promoted these new evaluative interactions arose to facilitate the establishment of efficient cooperative relationships. In short, the social control of behavior is essential to understand human cultural transmission. (shrink)

We consider the evolutionary scheme of morality proposed by Tomasello to defend the idea that the ability to orient the learning of offspring using signs of approval/disapproval could be a decisive and necessary step in the evolution of human morality. Those basic forms of intentional evaluative feedback, something we have called assessor teaching, allow parents to transmit their accumulated experience to their children, both about the behaviors that should be learned as well as how they should be copied. The rationale (...) underlying this process is as follows: if a behavior is approved, then it is good; if it is disapproved, then it is bad. The evaluative guidance on how to behave most probably spread among peers in situations of mutual benefit, such as cooperative child rearing. We argue that our hominin ancestors provided with this capacity for assessor teaching were ideally positioned to develop the two specifically human levels of morality proposed by Tomasello: the morality of fairness and the morality of justice. Assessor teaching could have facilitated the genesis of rudimentary codes of behavior tied with the need to agree about how to behave to succeed in joint cooperative activities. Moreover, learning through assessor teaching provides a plausible explanation for the origin of the objectivist and prescriptive dimensions of human morality. First, we emphasize that individuals feel that they evaluate the behavior of others objectively to guide their learning, and, second, we underline the imperative intention that any moral manifestation possesses. (shrink)

We use two logical resources, namely, the notion of recursively defined function and the Benardete-Yablo paradox, together with some inherent features of causality and time, as usually conceived, to derive two results: that no ungrounded causal chain exists and that time has a beginning.

Cantor’s proof that the powerset of the set of all natural numbers is uncountable yields a version of Richard’s paradox when restricted to the full definable universe, that is, to the universe containing all objects that can be defined not just in one formal language but by means of the full expressive power of natural language: this universe seems to be countable on one account and uncountable on another. We argue that the claim that definitional contexts impose restrictions on the (...) scope of quantifiers reveals a natural way out. (shrink)

La Enciclopedia IberoAmericana de Filosofía es un proyecto de investigación y edición coordinado por el Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid), el Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma (México) y el Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas (Buenos Aires), en el que han colaborado más de 500 especialistas de todos los países pertenecientes a la comunidad filosófica hispanoparlante. El proyecto consta de 35 volúmenes, cada uno de los cuales gira en torno a un tema monográfico, (...) tratado de modo diversificado e interdisciplinar. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with new self-tracking technologies. In particular, it focuses on a conceptual tension between the idea that disclosing personal information increases one’s autonomy and the idea that informational privacy is a condition for autonomous personhood. I argue that while self-tracking may sometimes prove to be an adequate method to shed light on particular aspects of oneself and can be used to strengthen one’s autonomy, self-tracking technologies often cancel out these benefits by exposing too much about oneself to (...) an unspecified audience, thus undermining the informational privacy boundaries necessary for living an autonomous life. (shrink)

This research statement presents a roadmap for the ethical evaluation of contact tracing apps. Assuming the possible development of an effective and secure contact tracing app, this roadmap explores three ethical concerns—privacy, data monopolists and coercion- based on three scenarios. The first scenario envisions and critically evaluates an app that is built on the conceptualization of privacy as anonymity and a mere individual right rather than a social value. The second scenario sketches and critically discusses an app that adequately addresses (...) privacy concerns but is facilitated by data monopolists such as Google and Apple. The final scenario discusses the coerced installation and use of a privacy-friendly, independently developed contact tracing app. The main worry is coercion through societal exclusion and limited societal participation. The statement concludes with three suggestions for designing an ethical contact tracing app and a research agenda. (shrink)

The central idea defended here is that ethical judgements are the product of the adaptive advantage provided by the conceptual capacity to categorise learned behaviour. In the same way that evolution of learning required the presence of value-laden brain structures that guide behaviour in the organism, we propose that the evolution of social learning and the development of human culture required the emergence of a new value system — the 'conceptual capacity to categorise'. This capacity is defined as the ability (...) to categorise one's own behaviour through a conceptual value code — 'favourable/unfavourable' or 'good/bad'. The conceptual capacity to categorise learned behaviour as good or bad was evolutionary successful because it transformed a system of rudimentary cultural transmission based on imitation into a system of efficient and biased cultural heredity based on teaching. Conceptual categorisation allowed the acquisition, through social learning, of adaptive information about behaviour, originating in/from the value-laden brain systems which control learning, without resorting to individual experience. We also suggest that the conceptual capacity to categorise conditioned the evolution of the human intelligence and that the ethical capacity arose as a by-product of both high intelligence and the ability to make evaluations of learned behaviour. (shrink)

The structure of Yablo’s paradox is analysed and generalised in order to show that beginningless step-by-step determination processes can be used to provoke antinomies, more concretely, to make our logical and our on-tological intuitions clash. The flow of time and the flow of causality are usually conceived of as intimately intertwined, so that temporal causation is the very paradigm of a step-by-step determination process. As a conse-quence, the paradoxical nature of beginningless step-by-step determina-tion processes concerns time and causality as usually (...) conceived. (shrink)

We model infinite regress structures — not arguments — by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.

Following an idea from Gödel and Carnap we show how we can speak with absolute generality even if we cannot quantify with absolute generality.

In response to Bhupinder Singh Anand''s article CAN WE REALLY FALSIFY TRUTH BY DICTAT? in THE REASONER II, 1, January 2008,that denies the existence of nonstandard models of Peano Arithmetic, we prove from Compactness the existence of such models.

Poincaré in a 1909 lecture in Göttingen proposed a solution to the apparent incompatibility of two results as viewed from a definitionist perspective: on the one hand, Richard’s proof that the definitions of real numbers form a countable set and, on the other, Cantor’s proof that the real numbers make up an uncountable class. Poincaré argues that, Richard’s result notwithstanding, there is no enumeration of all definable real numbers. We apply previous research by Luna and Taylor on Richard’s paradox, indefinite (...) extensibility and unrestricted quantification to evaluate Poincaré’s proposal. We emphasize that Poincaré’s solution involves an early recourse to indefinite extensibility and argue that his proposal, if it is to completely avoid Richard’s paradox, requires rejecting absolutely unrestricted quantification: Richard’s paradox provides a context in which paradox seems inescapable if unrestricted quantification is possible. In proposing his solution to the apparent conflict between Richard’s and Cantor’s results, Poincaré employs temporal expressions whose exact meaning he does not clarify. We suggest an interpretation of these expressions in terms of order of availability and briefly discuss its explanatory power in topics like paradoxes, limitation theorems and indefinite extensibility. (shrink)

Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that cannot be a computation.